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Abstract
The mediation of ambiguous markets has been essential to recent developments in economic
sociology. Cultural industries provide a valuable testing ground for its perspective of socially
influenced market behavior. This article emphasizes the uncertainty of cultural markets and
thus the relevance of social valuation in disseminating new releases. I hypothesize that recipients
of culture simplify cultural choice by reacting to easily attainable signals of product value.
Mechanisms of valuation include product familiarity, peer influence, and expert critique. Focusing
on an exemplary cultural market, I confront theoretical implications with data from the German
book industry (2001–2006). Panel and cross-section regressions show that, alongside well-defined
market segments, separate mechanisms guide consumer behavior. For incumbents’ offerings, prior
recognition stabilizes cultural choice and reinforces differences in market success. In the highly
ambiguous newcomer segment, imitation and negative media steer audience attention, at times
leading to unsatisfactory aggregate outcomes, i.e. ‘bad’ bestsellers.
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1 Introduction
Popular cultural markets operate under extreme uncertainty. On the production side, ‘no-
body knows’ (Goldman, 1983) which new manuscripts, songs, or screenplays will match
consumer preferences. To cope with uncertain product success manufacturers oversupply a
vast and diversified range of new releases (e.g., DiMaggio, 1977; Hirsch, 1972). For con-
sumers, cultural objects are highly ambiguous (Bielby and Bielby, 1994) and often lack clear
categorization (Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). In fact, this opacity is a constituent ingredient
of cultural consumption, as people rarely want to read novels or watch movies they already
know.
This environment provides a valuable testing ground for theories of socially influenced
market behavior. Within the sociological study of markets, cultural industries have received
particular interest, because they lack almost entirely any objective standards of valuation
(see Beckert, 2009; Zuckerman, 2012 for reviews). Adding to this perspective, I hypothesize
that recipients of culture, rather than relying on elaborate searches in markets with short
product lifecycles and ambiguous product categorization, simplify cultural choice by reacting
to more easily attainable signals of product value. Processes of valuation are thus crucial to
the operation of cultural markets and the successful dissemination of new releases.1
Valuation occurs through various channels including the reputation of creators and con-
tent (Bielby and Bielby, 1994), imitation among peers (Salganik et al., 2006), and evaluation
by professional critics (Shrum, 1991). Each mechanism effectively reduces uncertainty re-
garding a work’s value. Many prominent offerings such as popular fiction sequels, best-of
albums, or blockbuster movies obviate additional valuation. These offerings are sufficiently
familiar to a large potential audience and permit easy expectations as to their content and
quality. With rising ambiguity of offerings, however, sensitivity to additional sources of
valuation should increase.
Social scientists have long recognized the importance of ‘mediation’ in opaque markets.
Accordingly, this article relates to several literatures. First, I draw on the ‘Production of
Culture’ framework (DiMaggio, 1977; Hirsch, 1972; Peterson, 1976), which considers the
fabrication of culture a multi-step process involving a series of intermediaries regulating
the flow of cultural innovations from creation to potential consumption. Second, I call on
1Although some considerations presented here apply to cultural markets generally, this article encom-
passes only cultural mass markets for fiction, records, and movies. I exclude artistic markets such as for
paintings, sculptures, or antiques as they differ from mass markets in several ways: Their industrial or-
ganization is typically narrow, supply is limited and prices are relatively high. More importantly, specific
motivations such as investment and distinction (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984; Veblen, 1899), which play only minor
roles in popular mass markets, substantially drive consumer behavior in artistic markets.
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concepts of quality inference based on current product success (Bikhchandani et al., 1992;
Cialdini, 1984). Popularity-bound inferences, also termed ‘rational imitation’ (Hedström,
1998) or ‘herd behavior’ (Banerjee, 1992), describe individuals who follow others, regarding
their actions as useful indications of unknown outcomes. Third, I borrow from diffusion
research (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Rogers, 2003; Strang and Soule, 1998) the concepts
of ‘compatibility’ as well as of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ influence, which provide a common
language for synthesizing these diverse approaches to explain consumer choice and product
sales in cultural markets.
Undoubtedly various measures of artistic achievement as well as tensions between com-
mercial success and cultural recognition exist (e.g., Bourdieu, 1996; Craig and Dubois, 2010;
Verboord, 2011). When considering mediated markets, however, one must not mistake crit-
ical appraisals for measures of product success. Following Shrum (1991) and others (e.g.,
Gemser et al., 2007; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003), I consider cultural ‘consecrators’ as influ-
encers of aggregate demand rather than as recipients per se.
I structure the remainder as follows: In section 2, I sketch a theory of consumer behavior
in cultural markets in which poorly informed individuals rely on signals of product familiarity
as well as on internal and external valuation in selecting cultural content. This perspective
on mediated markets implies processes of cumulative advantage resulting in heavily skewed
market outcomes not necessarily justified in terms of ‘quality.’ Considering differences in
product familiarity permits generation of detailed hypotheses regarding product valuation
in market segments of varied opacity.
In section 3 I test these implications using exemplary sales data from the German fic-
tion market, employing both panel and cross-section regressions. Book markets are non-
transparent, providing permanent innovation and an ambiguous set of poorly classified offer-
ings. Book markets, like many cultural industries, exist within several niches, each featuring
a restricted identity and specific patterns of product valuation. Although successful releases
of previously unknown artists constantly reshuﬄe status hierarchies, a compelling gradient
in recognition between established writers and new entrants reinforces market segmentation.
Following the demands of Sauder et al. (2012) and Kovács and Sharkey (2014), the dataset
permits a direct test of the effects of several informational cues, discriminating among conse-
quences of reputation, popularity, and media coverage. In the concluding section, I relate my
findings to existing results from other cultural markets and indicate potential generalizations
to further domains of social interaction.
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2 Cultural choice
Hirsch (1972, p. 649) describes the role of consumers as “one of rank ordering cultural styles
and items ‘preselected’ for consideration.” I thus turn to consumer behavior to explain prod-
uct success in cultural markets. Still, this article does not address the social prerequisites
of taste or the reproductive function of cultural choice. Rather than studying ‘what’ and
‘how much’ culture people demand depending on their position in a social hierarchy (e.g.,
Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio 1987; Peterson, 1992), I hope to explain ‘by which means’ con-
sumers select cultural objects—within the range of offerings they like because, say, of socially
predefined tastes. This examination helps to identify basic mechanisms of cultural demand
and therefore permits conclusive interpretations on the emergence of bestsellers.
A useful theory of cultural choice must first capture specific attributes of cultural indus-
tries: Cultural markets provide experience goods (Nelson, 1970) whose characteristics and
‘quality’ one only learns fully through consumption.2 At the same time, the enjoyment of
cultural goods is expensive as it includes opportunity costs for the time spent consuming
them (Becker, 1976). Thus, consumers should be motivated to choose cultural content worth
both the money and the time required. Further, a convincing explanation must reproduce
several market outcomes typical for cultural industries: The proposed theory must allow a
highly skewed distribution of market success in that cultural mass markets exhibit strong
concentrations of recognition upon groups of stars (Frank and Cook, 1995). It must explain
short product lifecycles often peaking soon after initial release (DeVany, 2004) and capture
both a stabilization of demand for well-known artists, sequels, or genres (DeVany and Walls,
1999) and a convergence into sudden fads (Salganik et al., 2006).
2.1 General argument
The present explanation of cultural choice emphasizes the uncertainty of cultural markets
and thus the relevance of social valuation in disseminating new releases. Strictly speaking,
social recognition signals a product’s availability (Cialdini, 1984), quality (Podolny, 2005),
legitimacy (Rossman, 2014), and coordination potential (Clark et al., 2006). Offerings main-
tained by social valuation are more likely to be considered for consumption (Shocker et al.,
1991), increasing potential audience size (Kovács and Sharkey, 2014).
For precision, one can easily formalize this argument. Consumers i = 1, 2, ..., N within
a certain market or genre have the choice between two goods x and y (the latter can be
2‘Quality’ in this regard refers to the match of cultural content to individual preferences (e.g., Kovács
and Sharkey, 2014). It determines the individual pleasure of consuming the product but does not necessarily
correspond to an objective ranking of cultural value.
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a composite good encompassing all other market goods). Since quality is unobservable,
it does not affect individual selection behavior directly. Instead, consumers select culture
according to social recognition S, which one can capture in the individual utility function
ui = ui(x, y;Sx). In the most general interpretation, Sx serves as a complement of x,
increasing its consumption value (Becker and Murphy, 2000). Sx can be both indicative and
constitutive of utility. In either case, I assume higher levels of Sx to increase the expected
pleasure from enjoying x. Let xi ∈ [0, 1] be the individual tendency to select good x. Under
conformity to social cues, the tendency to choose x depends on the availability of Sx, such
that ∂xi/∂Sx > 0. Ceteris paribus, a product’s attractiveness increases with rising social
recognition.3
A series of empirical studies in cultural markets indicates that processes of product val-
uation draw on creators’ reputation (e.g., Bielby and Bielby, 1994; DeVany, 2004), products’
popularity (e.g., Salganik et al., 2006; Sorensen, 2007), and critics’ evaluation (e.g., Gemser
et al, 2007; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). Under ambiguity and uncertainty “those who pro-
pose new products are likely to be evaluated on the basis of reputations built upon prior
successes” (Bielby and Bielby, 1994, p. 1293). Bestseller lists mediate the relationship be-
tween artifacts and audiences, providing “concise manifestations of ‘what other readers like’ ”
(Verboord, 2011, p. 292). Finally, one can expect reception of culture to follow “experienced
characterizations by authorities and associates” (Shrum, 1991, p. 352).
In the first scenario, Sx represents the creator’s past successes or ‘star power.’ Familiar-
ity affects audience attention both directly and by moderating the relevance of additional
valuation in disseminating new releases. In the second case, Sx equals the product’s current
popularity relative to the demand for similar goods. This ‘internal’ source of product valu-
ation is measurable using sales rankings and indicates the majority opinion on the value of
x. The third interpretation stresses the importance of intermediaries, such that Sx reflects
the ‘external’ valuation provided by influential critics. I adopt the attributes ‘internal’ and
‘external’ valuation from diffusion research to distinguish between popularity-bound social
influence and media influence on cultural choice.
In the following, I discuss these proposed mechanisms of market mediation in more detail.
To facilitate empirical testing on the grounds of sales data, I will formulate propositions on
the product level, but all hypotheses refer to underlying patterns of individual consumer
behavior.
3For the sake of generalization, I leave the second order conditions unspecified. In cases of preferential
attachment (subsection 2.3), increases in popularity should affect audience attention over-proportionally
(∂2xi/∂S2x > 0). One can plausibly assume reputation (2.2) and expert evaluation (2.4), however, to influence
consumer choice at a decreasing marginal rate (∂2xi/∂S2x < 0).
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2.2 Familiarity
For successful dissemination innovations need some degree of legitimacy, i.e., similarity to
familiar content, existing ideas, or common practices (Coleman, et al. 1957; Graham, 1954).
In his compendium on the diffusion of innovations, Rogers (2003, p. 243) summarizes the
principle of ‘compatibility’ as follows: “Old ideas are the main mental tools that individuals
utilize to assess new ideas and give them meaning. Individuals cannot deal with an innovation
except on the basis of the familiar [...] against which an innovation can be interpreted, thus
decreasing its uncertainty.”
This argument closely relates to a fast-growing sociological literature on the cognitive
structuring of opaque markets. Initiated by Zuckerman’s (1999) seminal paper on product
classification among securities analysts, the mediation of ambiguous markets by categoriza-
tion has been at the core of recent theoretical advances in economic sociology (see Hannan,
2010; Zuckerman, 2012 for reviews). To assess the alignment and value of market offerings,
potential consumers refer to existing product categories against which they might evalu-
ate a new release (e.g., Negro et al., 2010). Failing to achieve a clear-cut product identity
exacerbates processes of product valuation. Prominently termed as ‘illegitimacy discount’
(Zuckerman, 1999), lack of conformity to well-established categories—for example, a dubious
genre classification (Hsu et al., 2009) or inadequate product naming (Zhao et al., 2013)—has
been shown to cause confusion and reduce audience attention.4
Rossman (2014) combines both strands of literature and argues that ‘categorical den-
sity,’ i.e. the number of successfully diffused innovations of the same category, determines
cognitive accessibility and perceived value of new releases. Others speak of strong ‘signal-
ing properties’ of familiar cultural content (Gemser et al., 2007) which effectively reduces
consumers’ uncertainty. Hence, interpreting Sx as an object’s relation to prior successful
content, I term the familiarity hypothesis:
H1 Familiarity increases the perceived value of cultural objects such that market success
is higher for well-known artists than for new entrants.
Two plausible mechanisms reinforce the proposed Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) or path-
dependency (Mahoney, 2000): First, repeated choice might be attractive because deriving
pleasure from cultural products typically requires some degree of prior knowledge (Adler,
1985; Bourdieu, 1984). For example, visiting a music festival might be more satisfactory if
4The use of pseudonyms demonstrates the relevance of focused identities in cultural markets. To protect
their followers from confusion, writers often use pen names for unorthodox publications. Agatha Christie, for
example, wrote love stories under the name of Mary Westmacott and Stephen King experiments as Richard
Bachman.
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one knows the bands, or reading a novel more rewarding given familiarity with the writer’s
previous work. Second, reputation serves as a focal point in helping people to synchronize
cultural consumption. This might be preferable, for example, if individuals enjoy discussions
among informed friends and acquaintances.
Considering that consumers sensitive to familiarity form habits for widely recognized
offerings, habitualization reinforces processes of cumulative advantage. This leads to impli-
cations similar to economic convention theory (Katz and Shapiro, 1986): Rather than being
of informational use, Sx then reflects benefits from coordination. In this case, the pleasure
from consuming x depends also on interactions with others, so that Sx indicates the avail-
ability of network externalities (DiMaggio and Garip, 2011; Granovetter, 1978). Thus, ‘star
power’ serves as an institutional device to coordinate cultural choice (Adler, 1985).
Taking the argument further, product familiarity should moderate the relevance of both
internal and external valuation: Well-established providers of cultural content cater to insti-
tutionalized market niches (i.e., their fan bases) and conform to salient product categories
(i.e., their previous bestselling releases) decoupling the success of ‘stars’ from social influence
and media coverage. In contrast, social recognition should be more important for newcomer
offerings, providing visibility for offerings not otherwise considered (Shocker et al., 1991) and
encouraging hesitant and ill-informed individuals to adopt an ambiguous innovation (Ross-
man, 2014). In the words of Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1957, p. 268) “it is precisely in
situations which are objectively unclear that social validation of judgments becomes most
important.” I call this the information hypothesis:
H2 Dissemination of new entrants’ offerings depends more strongly on additional sources
of valuation.
The informative function of familiarity is well-established within the Production of Cul-
ture framework. In a centerpiece, Bielby and Bielby (1994) show how television programmers
carefully use product categorizations to manage the reception of new series. “A linkage to
an established writer-producer [...] reduces the need to use other reputational or imitative
rhetorical strategies to describe a new series” (p. 1298).
2.3 Internal valuation
Hedström (1998) speaks of ‘rational imitation’ when individuals conform to others, regarding
their actions as useful indications of unknown outcomes (for similar arguments see Granovet-
ter, 1978; Merton, 1948; Salganik and Watts, 2008). In a similar vein, Zuckerman (2012)
refers to ‘socially endogenous inferences’ as a “powerful engine of social construction under
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conditions in which objective quality differences are relatively minimal” (p. 239). I thus
propose the internal valuation hypothesis:
H3 Current popularity increases the perceived value of cultural objects.
If individuals choose a certain offering x conditional on its popularity Sx, increases in
audience attention raise demand mostly in the outer region of the popularity distribution.
Consistent with concentrated market outcomes in popular culture, imitation implies a heavily
skewed valuation distribution and thus an enormous inequality of market success. Conse-
quently, the emergence of bestsellers follows a process of cumulative advantage (DiPrete and
Eirich, 2006), market outcomes thus depending critically on early consumer choices.
Sociology offers various explanations of social contagion, such as models of social diffusion
(Coleman et al., 1957) and threshold models of interpersonal influence (Granovetter, 1978).
To reproduce the spreading of innovations, however, they typically assume a fraction of ini-
tially activated individuals who subsequently infect their neighbors. Hence, these approaches
are inappropriate to explain how imitative dissemination actually begins. Focusing on the
emergence of conformity in decision situations under uncertainty, models of herd behavior
can fill this explanatory gap (Chamley, 2004).5
Herd models assume a sequence of individuals i = 1, 2, ..., n, ..., N , who each choose
between alternatives x and y. Each individual holds a binary guess (‘good’ or ‘bad’) as to
the value of each. Additionally, individuals have complete information on the behavior of
all previous decision makers. In cultural markets, omnipresent sales rankings approximate
this condition of full public information. When making a decision, individual n considers
her private signal as well as the public signal available from observing n − 1 predecessors.
If no clear trend indicates predecessors favoring one alternative over another, individual n
will follow her own guess. If previous choices accumulate upon one alternative, however,
individual n will ignore her private information and follow the crowd. In this case, public
information dominates her noisy guess and she deliberately chooses to be part of a herd to
increase her selection accuracy. In this formulation, herd behavior depends solely on the
succession of private signals failing to enable reliable prediction as to which alternative will
receive internal valuation.6
5Economists had originally proposed models of information cascades in the early 1990s (Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Since then sociological research has employed them fruitfully (e.g., Hedström,
1998; Strang and Macy, 2001).
6By allowing for selective imitation, the model can accommodate various social phenomena prevalent
in cultural markets, such as popularity spreading within clustered networks (Watts and Dodds, 2007), the
following of opinion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), or the pursuit of social distinction (Bourdieu, 1984).
In these cases, individuals consider only the actions of a certain subset of predecessors with whom they share
direct ties or whom they perceive as socially relevant.
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Although inferences grounded in popularity facilitate and stabilize expectations of prod-
uct value, the consequences of herd behavior can be astonishingly irrational. Unlike word-
of-mouth, which provides subjective accounts on the ‘quality’ of alternatives (Chevalier and
Mayzlin, 2006), imitation under the observable actions scenario has limited capabilities to
reduce opacity. Consequently, the approach is flexible enough to accommodate both unstable
market dynamics and specific market outcomes, such as ‘bad’ bestsellers.
Since individuals ignore private information once they are part of a ‘herd,’ the signal
from observational learning only reveals private information aggregated before a cascade has
begun. Resulting from limited information aggregation, herd behavior is fragile, such that
new information (e.g., critical reviews) can overturn existing cascades. More importantly,
consequences of rational imitation are not necessarily desirable in terms of market outcomes:
More popular goods might be better than others, but market success is hardly restricted to
superior offerings. Instead, the precision of private signals determines the probabilities for
well-led or misled herds. If too many people imitate the (misinformed) behavior of others, the
validity of public information is lost. This implication is fully in line with Zuckerman’s (2012,
p. 234) observation, that “conditions of high sensitivity to popularity have the potential to
greatly loosen objective constraints on valuation.” I therefore advance the quality hypothesis:
H4 Under opaque market conditions, product success might not be justified in terms of
‘quality.’
Commonly available information thus provides an objective constraint on the workings
of internal valuation. In transparent markets or market niches, internal valuation occurs
under relatively stable conditions, as consumers are well informed about the range and char-
acteristics of cultural output. Assuming precise information at least among early adopters
(Rogers, 2003), imitation allows determination of product success by ‘quality.’ However,
easily available information from the social environment is less valid for unfamiliar releases
trading under conditions of increased opacity.
2.4 External valuation
Valuation in cultural markets also depends on media coverage. In this perspective, Sx
represents recognition by influential critics. The mediating role of media has long been
recognized both in diffusion research (e.g., Bass, 1969; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985) and
within the Production of Culture framework (e.g., Hirsch, 1972; Shrum, 1991). As both
gatekeepers and tastemakers (Shrum, 1991), influential critics draw attention to cultural
offerings and provide ready-made product characterizations.
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The approval of a product’s value by well-respected authorities provides a clear indica-
tion of preferable product attributes. Thus, professional filtering should be crucial for in-
ducing visibility and establishing product legitimacy (see also Beckert, 2009; Lamont, 2012
for reviews). Bourdieu (1996) speaks of ‘consecration’ in describing how gatekeepers allot
symbolic capital to cultural goods. Others refer to status as offering an interpretative lens
through which audiences perceive quality and form valuations (Azoulay et al., 2014; Kovács
and Sharkey, 2014). In this sense, affiliation to high status reviewers provides both visibil-
ity (Gould, 2002) and quality signals (Podolny, 2005). Both mechanisms feed on the fact
that association with well-known actors is more easily observable than product value itself.
Indirectly, favorable reviews might serve as focal points for coordinated consumption and
guide distributors’ market strategies, reinforcing the original effects from external valuation.
Hence, I propose the external valuation hypothesis:
H5 Favorable reviews increase the perceived value of cultural objects.
In accordance with the information hypothesis, effects from external valuation should be
stronger for unfamiliar releases. However, prior results are inconclusive as to the evaluative
function of reviews. Shrum (1991), for example, reports heterogeneous responses to profes-
sional filtering in separate market segments, distinguishing between highbrow and popular
genres in performing arts (see also Gemser et al. 2007 for the case of motion pictures).
Shrum’s work suggests that favorable reviews may have no effect on audience attention if
reviewers’ sophisticated preferences do not coincide with recipients’ tastes. Similarly, Lam-
ont (2012) stresses that generation of value by external sources includes negotiations about
adequate evaluation criteria and the identification of legitimate judges.
Taking into account the literature on product categorization (Hannan, 2010; Zuckerman,
2012) further aggravates the formulation of straightforward implications from professional
evaluation. According to categorization research, simple and focused product identities must
coincide with established niche expectations (Hsu et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2013). Since
reviews are crucial in assigning product identities, commendation by the ‘wrong’ critic can
result in illegitimacy (Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). For example, a mainstream categorization
due to well-established critics’ favorable reviews could reduce the appeal of independent
newcomers by making them appear less fit to meet their original niche audience’s specialized
demands.
Having said that, one can plausibly assume that, particularly for otherwise unnoticed
offerings, the evaluative function of reviews is superimposed by their visibility effect, render-
ing specific evaluations irrelevant to audience attention. In this context, negative reviews—
opposing the common practice of favorable evaluation—could be particularly effective in
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stimulating audience attention (e.g., Berger et al., 2010; Clement et al., 2007). Negative
publicity informs consumers of a product’s existence and increases product accessibility. By
causing more stir it “encourages the product to be top of mind” (Berger et al., 2010, p. 816).
Then, again, the information hypothesis implies larger attention effects for new entrants’
releases. In the following, I confront my propositions with sales data from an exemplary
cultural market.
3 Evidence from a market for fiction
Within the study of cultural industries, fiction markets offer an adequate environment for
testing the proposed hypotheses. On the one hand, reading is highly time-consuming, which
should motivate people to select ‘good’ books. On the other, floods of poorly classified
new releases constantly confront consumers. More clearly than in other cultural markets,
both a high relevance of quality and strong uncertainty about product characteristics affect
consumer choice.
The cost of publishing a book is relatively low and, compared to manufacturers in other
cultural industries, publishing houses filter cultural content only weakly (Thompson, 2012).
From 2001 to 2006, the period presently studied, German publishers alone released around
4 080 hardcover novelties per year (Börsenverein, 2007). A survey conducted among 65
German publishers in 2003 shows that around half of them have more than 500 fiction titles
in their current portfolios; 50% of these novelties enter the market in less than 5 000 copies
(Homburg and Klarmann, 2004). Due to this abundance of offerings, the selective role of
consumers appears to be of particular importance in explaining product success.
3.1 Methodology
Book markets provide reliable process-produced data on the popularity of cultural goods.
Unlike most cultural markets, German book prices are fixed by law and thus independent
from popularity.7 This technical advantage precludes problems of endogeneity that could
arise if, for instance, retailers reduced prices of popular books to increase consumer attention
further.
Across fiction markets one can distinguish two segments differing strongly in market am-
biguity. When buying books by established writers, consumers are typically well-informed
7Hardcover prices vary little and depend on the number of pages and the style of binding rather than on
star power or publisher strategy. The sample’s mean book price is 20.1 Euro (26.3 US$) and the standard
deviation is 3.19 Euro.
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about their attributes due to advertisement, media coverage, in-store promotion, word-of-
mouth, or their own past consumption of the writers’ work. Valuation occurs in a stable,
easily assessable environment, in which familiar offerings conform to legitimate product cat-
egories. In the newcomer segment, however, consumers are poorly informed about novelties’
range and characteristics. Product classifications are highly ambiguous and newcomers lack
reputation. I exploit this segmentation to test the proposed hypotheses on product valuation
under varying conditions of product familiarity.
Throughout, I use product sales as the dependent variable. A number of studies have
employed similar strategies to identify determinants of market success for cultural offerings
such as Hollywood movies (DeVany andWalls, 1999), music records (Hendricks and Sorensen,
2009), and musical shows (Reddy et al., 1998). Several papers have also studied factors of
fiction market success. Book sales increase following rankings in the New York Times best-
seller list (Sorensen, 2007), in the wake of literary awards (Kovács and Sharkey, 2014), and
due to positive word-of-mouth (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Newspaper reviews and tele-
vision shows also stimulate audience attention. Most interestingly, positive sales effects may
also arise from negative reviews and controversial discussions (Berger et al., 2010; Clement
et al., 2007).
3.2 Data
The dataset consists of all 798 hardcover fiction titles which reached a Top 50 sales rank
in Germany for at least one week between September 2001 and August 2006.8 The dataset
covers all weeks a book ranked in the Top 50 (which I call its lifecycle). The N time series
differ in length T (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ).
Naturally, the dataset is strongly biased towards the most successful end of the market.
Of approximately 4 080 hardcover releases per year, only 4% ever reach the Top 50. Sample
limitation has obvious consequences on external validity restricting my findings’ generaliz-
ability to relatively popular releases. More problematically, however, success bias can induce
complicated causal structures threatening internal validity (Denrell and Kovács, 2008; El-
wert and Winship, 2014). I will address potential endogenous selection bias in additional
sensitivity analyses concerning the effects of external valuation. That said, the sample shows
considerable variation in market success; 16% of titles reach the Top 50 for only one week,
while 4% remain for a year and longer. Restriction to Top 50 titles effectively reduces un-
8The sample includes books from seven genres: ‘novel’ (412 titles), ‘crime and thriller’ (254), ‘historical
novel’ (50), ‘science fiction and fantasy’ (35), ‘before 1945’ (18), ‘biography’ (11), and ‘other’ (18). Altogether
79 publishers marketed these books.
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observed heterogeneity: Among other things it ensures that all sampling units were equally
available in bookstores during the period under investigation.
Rank data are from Buchreport (2008). The book market news agency determines weekly
Top 50 sales ranks from electronic cash register scans in 350 representatively selected book-
stores across Germany.9 Based on ordinal ranks Rt ∈ [1, 50], a book’s inverse listing (51−Rt)
roughly approximates its weekly sales. However, this specification rests on a proportional
rank-volume relation. To model a more realistic parabolic relation, we must weight the ordi-
nal approximation (see Appendix A1 for details). Then, a book’s approximated ‘total sales
volume’ equals the sum of weighted sales ranks over its full Top 50 lifecycle.
Figure 1: Distribution of market success
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The allocation of market success is heavily skewed (see Figure 1). Half of the sampled
books drop out of the Top 50 within seven weeks of their release, earning up to 31 sales
units. The sample’s most successful publication is Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code which
between February 2004 and September 2006 earned a total of 5 294 sales units. Assessing the
inequality of market success, the Gini coefficient (ranging from 0 (equality) to 1 (complete
inequality)) is 0.76. The distribution of sales follows an L-shaped pattern, clearly exhibiting
a heavy tail of extremely popular books: An obvious group of bestsellers (with >500 sales
units) consists of 70 titles (9% of the sample) accounting for 59% of Top 50’s total sales
volume.
9The procedure excluded online sales. At the time of study online sales accounted for less than 10% of
total fiction sales in Germany (Börsenverein, 2007).
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3.3 Panel analysis
In a longitudinal form, we can use the dataset to identify the proposed effects of internal
and external valuation on product sales. Considering the logarithm of approximate weekly
sales as the dependent variable, I estimated the following fixed effects (FE) panel regression
to test for internal valuation:
log Yit = αi + β1S+it + β2S−it + β3S0it + β4Mit + β5t+ β6t2 + uit.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, the model contains N dummies αi which account for
time-invariant characteristics such as the story, binding, and price of book i; uit represents
the idiosyncratic error term. A series of time-variant dummies captures the effects of social
influence (see Table 1). Based on the variation of sales within book-specific lifecycles, I
have computed their effects by comparing sales in a stimulus week to average sales in non-
treatment weeks. Counting the weeks from entering the Top 50, t and t2 model a dominant
trend of decurved lifecycles.10 To account for varying degrees of opacity and specific valuation
processes for familiar and unfamiliar objects, I estimated regressions separately for newcomer
books (written by Top 50 debutants) and books by established writers (who had previously
reached Top 50 with at least one prior publication).11
Table 1: Description of panel variables
Books with event Week of event
Construct Measurement N % Mean Median
Strong social influence S+t 1 if first time in Top 1–10 in t− 1 121 18.0 1.82 1
Weak social influence S−t 1 if first time in Top 11–20 in t− 1 234 34.7 2.40 2
No social influence S0t 1 if first time in Top 21–25 in t− 1 148 22.0 2.89 2
TV coverage Mt 1 if endorsed in TV show in t 61 9.1 4.61 1
Newspaper review Rt 1 if reviewed in newspaper in t 240 35.6 6.66 5
Time trend t number of weeks from Top 50 entry 674 100.0
In book markets, sudden increases in popularity-bound social influence are quantifiable
based upon bestseller lists. To test the internal valuation hypothesis I consider the most
10A cubic approximation of the lifecycle trend proved insignificant; an alternative specification based on
weekly dummies left results unchanged.
11The inclusion of lagged independent variables requires that book-specific time series have a minimum
length of 2 weeks. This reduces total sample size to N = 674. As social cues typically build up early in
the lifecycle (see Table 1) and only 116 titles remained in the Top 50 for more than half a year, I truncate
lifecycles at T = 26. For the control of time trends all models include both treated and untreated books
(although the latter do not contribute directly to the estimation of treatment effects).
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prominent ranking published in the weekly magazine Der Spiegel, displayed in many book-
shops and frequently referred to in other media. The list uses Buchreport’s rank data and
each week specifies the 20 most successful titles. I expect strong social influence from listings
in the top half of the ranking. Hence the dummy S+t equals 1 in the week following a book’s
first listing in the Top 1–10, and 0 in all other weeks. S−t represents minor social influences,
marking the week after a book’s first Top 11–20 position (results are robust to alternative cut
points, see footnote 12). Altogether, 355 books qualified for a publicly announced bestseller
status. S0t captures the week in which a book first neared, but missed, the ranking (Top
21–25 in t − 1). This variable serves as a counterfactual, indicating the absence of internal
valuation (see Sorensen, 2007 for a similar operationalization). The determination of cul-
tural choice by popularity implies β1 > β2 > β3 = 0. Further, by distinguishing familiar
from unfamiliar releases one can predict β1 and β2 to be higher for new entrants than for
incumbents (information hypothesis).
Mt is a dummy of media attention. It reflects whether a book came to be discussed in
Lesen!, Germany’s most prominent literary TV show at the time of study. Again, the in-
formation hypothesis suggests stronger effects from television coverage for poorly legitimized
newcomer offerings.
Table 2 displays the panel results. In the newcomer segment, internal valuation clearly
affects readers’ choice (model 1). Following a first Top 10 listing, debuts exhibit sales 74%
higher than in weeks without treatment. A weaker social stimulus increases sales by 32%
on average. Both effects differ significantly in magnitude (p < .001) and point estimates
resemble the expected order β1 > β2 > β3 ≈ 0. Indicated by the zero effect of the placebo
variable S0t , popularity-bound social influence can be interpreted as being causal to cultural
choice.
These effects are similar, but much smaller in magnitude, for less ambiguous offerings
(model 4). Wald tests indicate significant differences in the estimates of S+t (p < .001)
and S−t (p = .021) for new entrants and incumbents. This finding clearly supports the
information hypothesis: For followers of established writers, bestseller rankings come as less
of a surprise and exercise relatively little consequence. Further, differences between ‘strong’
and ‘weak’ social influence are relatively small and insignificant (p = .255).12
12Results are robust to alternative specifications of social influence: First, new entrants benefit signifi-
cantly more from reaching the list in general regardless of the position obtained in the ranking (45% higher
sales in the following week vs. 18% for incumbents for a first-time listing at rank 1–20). Second, a finer
grading of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ influence along cut points 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, and 16–20 shows similarly that
newcomers benefit significantly more from high-ranking (1–10) than from low-ranking first-time listings (11–
15 and 16–20; effects for ranks 1–5 and 6–10 are statistically indiscernible). In contrast, effects for incumbents
are much smaller in size and differences between ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ social influence are insignificant.
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Table 2: Effects of internal and external valuation on weekly sales
Newcomers Established
1 2 3 4 5 6
FE FE FEIS FE FE FEIS
β t β t β t β t β t β t
Strong social influence .737∗∗∗ (7.44) .238∗∗∗ (3.44)
Weak social influence .315∗∗∗ (5.29) .148∗∗ (3.31)
No social influence .038 (.45) −.021 (.38)
Positive review −.031 (.35) −.043 (.75) .145∗ (1.96) −.016 (.43)
Neutral review .030 (.46) .069 (1.69) .068 (.99) .048 (1.64)
Negative review .273∗∗ (2.79) .159∗ (2.40) .076 (1.51) −.026 (.65)
Review in t+ 1 .009 (.17) −.017 (.47) .009 (.20) −.024 (1.13)
TV coverage 1.028∗∗∗ (4.08) .997∗∗∗ (3.96) 1.101∗∗∗ (5.61) .719∗ (2.55) .707∗ (2.52) .717∗∗∗ (3.50)
Weeks since release −.025∗ (2.54) −.038∗∗∗ (3.84) −.072∗∗∗ (9.20) −.079∗∗∗ (10.99)
Weeks since release2 −.0007 (1.78) −.0003 (.71) .0001 (.19) .0003 (1.03)
Constant 2.003∗∗∗ (32.09) 2.094∗∗∗ (32.83) 2.732∗∗∗ (51.72) 2.776∗∗∗ (60.43)
N observations 3828 3828 3672 5679 5679 5621
N books 317 317 241 357 357 323
R2 within .282 .259 .046 .579 .576 .015
Panel regression with book fixed effects (FE, models 1, 2, 4, and 5) and individual-specific slopes (FEIS, models 3 and 6). Dependent variable: log
weighted sales rank Yit. Non-standardized coefficients, robust absolute t-values in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.001, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗ p<0.05.
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Corroborating the moderation effect of familiarity, endorsement on television is more
relevant to the success of unfamiliar products. In accordance with results from the US
(Sorensen, 2007), the consequences of television coverage surpass all other effects, briefly
doubling newcomer sales.
On average, books by established writers show strong opening power, followed by steep
declines in weekly sales resembling an ‘exogenous’ trend typical of legitimate innovations
(Rogers, 2003; Rossman, 2014). Both the overall constant (p < .05) and the decrease over
time (p < .001) are significantly smaller for unfamiliar objects. Due to the dominant time
trend among incumbent offerings, model determination is considerably higher for familiar
offerings.
Figure 2: Distribution of experts’ evaluations
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To test the external valuation hypothesis I collected review data for all sampled books
evaluated in at least one of Germany’s three leading national newspapers Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Die Zeit, between 2001 and 2006. In total, I
gathered 761 newspaper reviews on 368 titles. I then employed quantitative content analysis
(Riffe et al., 2005) to distill objectively the opinion expressed in each text (see Appendix A2
for the procedure). The content analysis generates considerable variation in review scores
(see Figure 2). A positive (negative) review score indicates a relatively good (bad) evaluation
by professional literary critics.
For the present study, I group newspaper reviews into positive (best 25%), negative
(worst 25%) and neutral (intermediate 50%) judgments (see Figure 2). Within their Top
50 lifecycle 116 debutant and 124 incumbent titles received at least one review. To check
whether professional critique indeed has a causal effect on cultural choice, all models include
an additional dummy, marking the week before publication of a newspaper review. If the
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pre-review placebo shows a positive effect on subsequent sales, critics would seem to follow,
rather than leading, consumer behavior (Basuroy et al., 2003; Eliashberg and Shugan, 1997;
Gemser et al., 2007).
Model 2 clearly discards the external valuation hypothesis for consumers of novel content.
Surprisingly, releases of approving information like neutral reviews show no sales effect for
newcomer books. Instead, only disapproving reviews positively affect audience attention, on
average increasing sales by 27% in the week following publication. The pre-review dummy
is insignificant, suggesting a leading role of professional critics. Estimates differ for readers
of established content (model 5). In line with the external valuation hypothesis, demand
reactions result only from approving reviews (p = .05). Again, there is no significant result for
neutral evaluations, highlighting the attention effect from reviews expressing strong opinions.
Prior findings from the US closely correspond to my FE results: Berger et al. (2010) indicate
that established writers benefit only from positive evaluation whereas less familiar authors
similarly gain from negative reviews. For the German book market Clement et al. (2007)
report increased sales following both positive and negative discussion in a renowned literary
television show.
I cannot fully rule out the possibility of endogenous selection bias (Elwert and Winship,
2014). Books might reach the Top 50 only because they received critical appraisal, potentially
biasing estimated effects of external valuation. Consequently, both models consider only
newspaper reviews published after a book’s first Top 50 listing, i.e. books do not enter
the sample because of the treatment considered.13 Further, critics might review books by
familiar authors when they come out but only review the unfamiliar when they have become
popular. I tested whether critics discriminate between newcomers and established writers:
There are no significant differences in the timing of reviews with respect to both the time
passed since a book’s release (p = .907) and its Top 50 position before the review (p = .218).
Also, differences of review scores are minimal and insignificant for both newcomers and
incumbents.
Still, one might expect filtering decisions to vary with book characteristics resulting, most
plausibly, in more frequent reviews for promising books (Dobrescu et al., 2013; Reinstein and
Snyder, 2005). Indeed, covered books hold Top 50 positions some 1.5-ranks higher on average
than non-reviewed books in the week before a review’s publication (p = .087). Selection on
13Still, as suggested by Denrell and Kovács (2008), I ran additional regressions restricted to observations
which reached the sampling condition long before receiving the treatment. I chose a forerun of 4 weeks,
excluding all books which in this period had received reviews by any of the three newspapers considered.
Although sample size is considerable smaller (43 newcomer and 55 incumbent books) results remain robust:
Books by familiar authors benefit from positive evaluations (β = .215; t = 2.61) while newcomer sales increase
only after negative reviews (β = .443; t = 2.93).
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steeper sales trajectories violates exogenous treatment assignment and thus the assumption
of parallel sales trends for books with and without media coverage. If the treatment variable
positively associates with unobservables and unobservables interact with time, FE estimates
will be biased upwards (Brüderl and Ludwig, 2015).
Allowing for heterogeneous sales trajectories—and thus a weaker exogeneity
assumption—I extended the fixed effects approach in models 3 and 6 to account for
individual-specific slopes (FEIS; see Brüderl and Ludwig, 2015: 336-338; Wooldridge, 2010:
374-381). Conditioning on both t and t2 I estimated
log Yit = α1i + α2it+ α3it2 +Xitβ + uit .
While FE demeans individual panels to eliminate differences in outcome levels across books,
FEIS additionally purges individual-specific slopes. Technically, FEIS runs pooled OLS
regressions on detrended data such that estimated treatment effects β are unaffected by
individual differences in both levels (modeled in α1i) and growth (modeled in α2i and α3i).14
Although absorbing some of its size the extended analysis retains the positive effect of
negative evaluation for unfamiliar offerings (model 3). Obviously, the evaluative function
of reviews is superimposed by their attention effect. The placebo’s zero influence shows
similarly in FEIS regression, permitting a causal interpretation of the positive effect from
scathing reviews. In the established segment, however, favorable reviews cease to increase
sales (model 6). This ineffectiveness of external valuation in the FEIS perspective suggests
that critics are inclined to reviewing incumbents’ promising books. Treatment assignment is
thus biased towards commercially viable releases, favoring sales trajectories which increase
in the following weeks regardless of receiving positive media attention.
For unfamiliar offerings estimated effects of external valuation conform to Shrum’s (1991,
p. 368) finding that “even mediocre or negative reviews are better than no review at all.”
Consequences of professional critique thus deviate considerably from effects of word-of-mouth
among peers, the persuasion effects of which are well-documented (Chevalier and Mayzlin,
2006; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Ehrmann and Schmale, 2008). Once newspaper coverage is
of little evaluative function, negative reviews—opposing the common practice of favorable
evaluation—appear particularly effective in stimulating product visibility. Corroborating
the information hypothesis attention effects of negative evaluation are large and significant
only for newcomers. External valuation thus evokes unintended consequences. In contrast
to perceptions by status theorists (e.g., Gould, 2002; Podolny, 2005) readers of Top 50
14The inclusion of α1i, α2i, and α3i requires that individual panels have a minimum length of T = 4,
reducing sample size to 241 debutant and 323 incumbent books.
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books do not act on approving information by influential intermediaries. This leads to
the conclusion that consumer behavior reshapes expert mediation, and—unlike conventional
appraisals (e.g., Hirsch, 1972; Zuckerman, 1999)—critics alone do not purposely determine
the fates of new releases.
3.4 Cross-section analysis
From the present discussion it becomes clear that consumers’ reactions to internal and exter-
nal valuation vary with product familiarity. A final cross-section analysis provides descriptive
results on the stabilizing role of reading habits and on the ‘quality’ of market outcomes for
familiar and unfamiliar books. For this purpose, I estimated the following OLS regression
using the logarithm of total sales volumes as the dependent variable:
log
T∑
t=1
Yit = β0 + β1Qi + β2 logFi + β3Mi + β4Ri +Xiβ + ui .
I refer to ‘quality’ as the match of cultural content to individual preferences (e.g., Kovács
and Sharkey, 2014). Q thus represents a book’s average consumer evaluation. Amazon’s
highly frequented voting apparatus, which lets customers rate books easily by assigning 1 [–]
to 5 [+] stars, provides a suitable indicator (see Appendix A3 for a discussion). According
to the quality hypothesis, a work’s intrinsic value drives consumer choice subject to imitation
only given high market transparency (β1 > 0). Validity of social proof crumbles if individual
beliefs as to a work’s value are noisy and too many people imitate others’ misinformed
behavior. In the more ambiguous newcomer segment, ‘quality’ should remain irrelevant
(β1 ≈ 0).
F indicates the star power of writers and thus their familiarity among readers. I specify
the concept as the sum of past Top 50 notations an author has achieved with prior publi-
cations. The variable is valid only for 393 books by established authors, ranging from 5 to
1 131 weeks of previous listings (median: 36) and used on a logarithmic scale. The familiarity
hypothesis implies β2 > 0.
Further covariates control for additional sources of inter-book heterogeneity (Table 3).
M and R resemble the previous dummies of media attention in a cross-section variant, each
book covered receiving the value 1. Finally, X is a vector including the price-per-page in
Eurocent (inflation adjusted, log), a full set of genre dummies, and an indicator of market
competition. The latter controls for the presence of popular offerings of the same category
against which one might compare a new release. These substitutes potentially limit i’s
market success. The variable is the z-standardized sum of sales by titles of the same genre
released in the same month as the book under consideration.
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Table 3: Description of cross-section variables
Construct Measurement Min Max Mean (sd) Median
Consumer evaluation Q number of Amazon stars, N
a 1.50 5.00 3.90 (.68) 4.00
9 levels 1–5 Ea 1.50 5.00 3.72 (.68) 4.00
Past popularity logF log number of weeks author 0 0 0 0previously listed Top 50 1.61 7.03 3.66 (1.20) 3.58
TV coverage M dummy, 0 1.00 .151 if endorsed in TV show 0 1.00 .05
Newspaper review R dummy, 0 1.00 .541 if reviewed in newspaper 0 1.00 .39
Price
X
log Eurocents .62 3.13 1.72 (.40) 1.69
per page .38 2.63 1.69 (.36) 1.67
Competition z-std. sum of sales −1.55 4.11 .03 (.99) −.24by same genre books −1.55 3.51 −.03 (1.01) −.33
a First (second) line indicates books by newcomer (established) writers.
Again, I estimated separate regressions for new entrants and for incumbents. Table 4
displays standardized beta coefficients, allowing direct comparison of the relative strengths
of effects across explanatory variables. In the established segment, the model explains 37%
of the variation in book sales. The predictability of newcomer success is markedly lower.
Table 4: Determinants of total sales
Newcomers Established
beta t beta t
Consumer evaluation −.129∗∗ (2.71) .111∗ (2.48)
log Past popularity .538∗∗∗ (14.36)
TV coverage .268∗∗∗ (5.34) .082∗ (1.68)
Newspaper review .197∗∗∗ (3.57) .163∗∗∗ (3.37)
log Price −.200∗∗∗ (3.63) −.104∗ (2.10)
Competition −.072 (1.63) −.109∗∗ (2.62)
Genre fixed effects yes yes
N 405 393
R2 .164 .374
OLS regression with genre fixed effects. Dependent variable: log sum of weighted sales ranks Yit. Standard-
ized beta-coefficients, robust absolute t-values in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.001, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗ p<0.05.
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Consumer evaluations associate only weakly with audience attention, yet results differ
for familiar and unfamiliar offerings. In the established segment, increases in perceived
quality associate positively with product success. This is true only while consumers remain
sufficiently informed about the products on offer. Consistent with the quality hypothesis,
consumers are less able to determine whether unfamiliar content will satisfy their individual
preferences. In the newcomer segment, consumer evaluations relate negatively to sales: In
terms of non-standardized coefficients, sales decline by 33% on average with each additional
star. Obviously, market outcomes are socially less desirable under more opaque market
conditions. When the buildup of popularity decouples from what people perceive as a good
read, ‘bad’ bestsellers emerge more frequently.
In the established segment, the indicator of reputation contributes most to the expla-
nation of market success. A 10% increase in past popularity on average yields 7.8% higher
sales. Supporting the familiarity hypothesis, this finding is in line with prior evidence on the
stabilizing role of star power in both Germany (Clement et al., 2007) and the US (Sorensen,
2007).
In both segments, the dummies of media coverage show the expected positive signs.
Again, visibility effects of media coverage are stronger for more ambiguous releases. Although
lacking a control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., self-selection by critics), cross-section
regressions reproduce the findings from panel analysis. Finally, monetary considerations
affect cultural choice and substitution can be a mild threat to book market success: Books
by well-known writers sell significantly less when released simultaneously with successful
alternatives of the same genre.
4 Discussion
Considering the abundance of cultural supply paired with quality uncertainty on the audience
side, I argue that market ambiguity vigorously affects cultural choice. Hence, scrutinizing
cultural choice reveals the workings of various social cues in informationally imperfect set-
tings. Processes of cultural valuation draw on reputation of creators and content, imitation
among peers, and, to a lesser extent, evaluation by professional critics. Each mechanism
effectively reduces uncertainty regarding a work’s value and thus contributes to the new
releases’ successful dissemination.
My findings from an exemplary book market suggest that, alongside the boundary of two
well-defined market segments, separate mechanisms guide cultural choice. On the one hand,
consumers seek books by established writers under relatively little ambiguity, so that product
valuation occurs in a stable, more easily assessable environment. In the established segment,
22
previous recognition stabilizes cultural choice and reinforces differences in market success.
Newcomer content, on the other hand, trades under more opaque information conditions.
Absent product familiarity, additional sources of valuation are thus highly influential upon
audience attention. As a result of high product ambiguity, poorly informed readers are
prone to flock to the most popular alternatives and, most surprisingly, to negatively reviewed
books. In consequence, processes of product valuation are susceptible to distortion and the
emergence of bestsellers anything but restricted to worthwhile offerings.
These findings also renew questions on the filtering role of professional critics (Gemser
et al., 2007; Shrum, 1991; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). Due to the dominance of attention
effects, and in stark contrast to word-of-mouth among peers (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006;
Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; Ehrmann and Schmale, 2008), newspaper reviews on average lack
evaluative function. The strong unintended consequences of negative reviews for debuts cast
doubt on common reviewing practices in which, following professional norms, critics often
caution their readers against disappointing releases. This surprising result might also be
due to differentiation of book markets. Cultural markets consist of various niches and many
professional critics only target specific consumer groups. For example, receiving negative
reviews by mainstream critics could contribute to the appeal of independent newcomers (cf.,
Gemser et al., 2007; Zuckerman and Kim 2003). Taking into account finer-grained variations
of product identities might thus lead to different estimates of external valuation and add to
our understanding of negotiations about legitimate cultural agents (Bourdieu, 1996; Lamont,
2012).
Furthermore, my findings relate directly to existing results from other cultural markets.
Salganik et al. (2006) demonstrated how imitation shapes demand for novel pop songs. Cor-
roborating my results on questionable market outcomes, they showed that under increased
social influence the rank order of market success associates with consumer evaluations mod-
erately at best. Zuckerman and Kim (2003) investigated how feature film audiences respond
to product identities certified by professional critics. Their results indeed revealed a partial
loss in audience attention for niche products assigned mainstream categorizations. Finally,
Azoulay et al. (2014) studied the accumulation of scientific reputation after researchers re-
ceived prestigious prizes. In line with my results on the effectiveness of valuation conditional
on product familiarity, award effects on subsequent citations were significantly larger for
young researchers and for low-ranking journal publications.
My analysis also generalizes to other phenomena of social interaction. The mechanism
of observational learning and its potentially adverse consequences are highly prevalent in
daily living. Examples include various situations of uncertainty, such as crowd behavior
(Helbing et al., 2000), financial investment (Kelly, 2008), management practices (DiMaggio
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and Powell, 1983), medical prescription (Coleman et al., 1957), norm violation (Keuschnigg
and Wolbring, 2015), and political protest (Siegel, 2009). In most of these applications, the
imitation of high-status actors, as opposed to the general population, is particularly relevant.
High-status role models benefit from the ascription of superior market knowledge (Katz and
Lazarsfeld, 1955), represent agents of legitimate culture (Bourdieu, 1996), serve as nuclei of
crystallization in the presence of coordination benefits (Clark et al., 2006), or simply exhibit
larger personal networks (Watts and Dodds, 2007).
Building on classical contributions, such as Bourdieu’s (1996) analysis of ‘consecration’
and DiMaggio’s (1987) account on ‘classification in art,’ research on product legitimacy has
become an important branch of the sociological study of culture (Baumann et al., 2009). All
the same, heuristic systems of categorization play an important part in structuring markets
in general (Hannan, 2010). Receiving a legitimate identity determines the resources available
to organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and contributes to the creation of new markets
(Negro et al., 2010).
While my empirical work tackles some methodological challenges of cultural research,
three drawbacks remain. First, the limitation to Top 50 products prevents the study of early
dissemination of previously unknown ‘cultural innovations.’ Second, typically for studies
of diffusion, my analysis ignores the dissemination of less-successful products. Although
I cannot fully rule out biased estimates due to endogenous sample selection, sensitivity
analyses corroborate my finding according to which, at least among Top 50 newcomers,
negative reviews have positive consequences. Third, my results rely in part on a disputable
quantification of artistic ‘quality.’ Surely, given the multi-dimensionality of the concept as
well as high interpersonal variation as to what constitutes a ‘good’ cultural offering, the idea
of measuring artistic value objectively itself requires fundamental questioning. However,
so long as we interpret ‘quality’ as the match of product characteristics with individual
preferences, the chosen approximation seems acceptable.
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A1 Measuring sales volumes
To avoid manipulations, Buchreport (2008) does not report absolute weekly sales volume
data. The simple specification of weekly ‘sales volumes’ as a book’s inverse rank (51 − Rt)
rests on the unsatisfactory assumption of a proportional rank-volume relationship: Sales
differences are strictly 1 across the full range of R (see the dashed line in Figure A1 (a); see
Clement et al., 2007 for a similar measure of book market success). Hence, I weighted the
ordinal rank data to model a more realistic parabolic rank-volume relationship.
Figure A1: Approximation of weekly sales volumes
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The online seller Amazon provides a suitable metric for factoring weekly rank data into
a skewed distribution of sales. Online customers can easily rate books by assigning ‘stars’ of
valuation. Using the company’s German website, I recorded weekly increases in the number
of votes per book for 57 fiction titles listed in the Amazon Top 50 over a period of four
weeks in February and March 2010. (These titles are not in the original dataset). Under the
mild assumption that weekly increases in votes associate linearly with actual shifts in sales,
the frequency of new votes Z per Amazon sales rank R can weight the ordinal rank data. I
estimated the association between Z and the corresponding rank R (see the scattered circles
in Figure A1 (b)) with a negative binomial model of the form Z = exp(β0 + β1R + β2R2).
After rescaling the estimates to preserve the original range of R ∈ [1, 50], the equation
Yit = exp(4.032− .121Rit+ .001R2it) returns the approximate sales volume of book i in week
t. This specification effectively models a highly unequal allocation of book market success.
A 5.6-unit difference separates the 1st and 2nd rank, while ranks 49 and 50 differ only by
0.01 (see the solid line in Figure A1 (a)).
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A2 Measuring expert evaluations
Scholars of literature typically distinguish five dimensions of evaluation for fiction books (e.g.,
Heydebrand and Winko, 1996): formal characteristics, the story’s originality, its sufficiency,
its cognitive appeal, and its overall hedonic effect. Alongside this categorization, literary
research has identified the expressions most critics use in characterizing a book’s readability.
The present content analysis employs a dictionary of German words, assembled by Köhler
(1999), which includes the expressions critics from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, and Die Zeit use most frequently to assess literary content. I generated
a list of 608 expressions (the full list is available upon request) covering all five dimensions
of evaluation. Each signal word relates either positively or negatively to one dimension of
literary value. For generality, I reduced each word to its minimum decisive length (e.g., ‘en-
tertain’ instead of ‘entertaining’). Using specialized software, I marked the passages in each
text containing signal words. For validity, I excluded all references in negated sentences,
leaving a total of 17 583 findings (23 per review). For each review, I subtracted the findings
of negative signal words from the number of positive findings. I interpret the resultant dif-
ference as representing the review’s basic notion. Since the dictionary includes more positive
than negative expressions, I z-standardized the indicator (mean=0, standard deviation=1).
To assess the validity of review scores, I gathered additional data from Südwestrundfunk
(SWR), a radio and television broadcaster which publishes a monthly list of ‘highly readable’
books recommended by 30 professional critics. 82 (10%) of the sampled books received
mention, providing a binary measure for ‘literary value.’ The correlation between review
scores and the alternative dummy is moderate but highly significant (r = .218; p < .001).
For the present study, literary reviews are positive (best 25%), negative (worst 25%), and
neutral (intermediate 50%) judgments. Alternative specifications, such as splitting categories
at the mean and omitting the neutral group or allowing three equally sized groups, lead to
results similar to those in Table 2. Altogether, I considered all reviews released during a
book’s Top 50 lifecycle. If several newspapers reviewed a book simultaneously, I used the
average rating of the opinions expressed.
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A3 Measuring consumer evaluations
I refer to ‘quality’ as the match of cultural content to individual preferences (e.g., Kovács
and Sharkey, 2014). Quality, individually perceived, determines the pleasure of consuming
the product but does not necessarily correspond to an objective ranking of cultural value. I
am aware of the difficulties arising from any attempt at measuring artistic value objectively.
For the present purpose, I define ‘quality’ as the average pleasure an audience derives from
reading a book. By asking members of a specific cultural offering’s target audience how
much they enjoyed it, this consumer evaluation accounts for varying aesthetic dispositions
across social strata and cultural genres (Bourdieu, 1984).
Data on such an operationalization are easily obtainable from Amazon’s star rating sys-
tem. At the time of data collection (January 2007, using the online seller’s German website),
the average vote for each sampled book was displayed in full and half stars, providing a 9-step
variable (see Table 3). On average, I computed each evaluation from 33 individual votes.
It is important to note that the dependent variable excludes online sales. Hence, I
interpret Amazon votes as a measure of ‘quality’ rather than a stimulus to sales. Still, since
I gathered the votes in retrospect, consumer evaluations may be endogenous to product
popularity. Kovács and Sharkey (2014) report deteriorated ratings from readers after a
book received a literary prize: Increases in audience attention enlarge the pool of potential
evaluators, including not only devotees of a narrow niche but also a broader, more sceptical
sample of the general population. To test whether the popularity of books affects their
evaluation among online customers, I regressed the average valuation per book on the (log)
volume of votes. It shows that a 10% increase in volume reduces the average evaluation by
.009 stars. The effect is highly significant, yet small enough in size to reject a substantial
endogeneity bias.
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